

# Type-based Dependency Analysis for JavaScript

## PLAS'13

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

*Matthias Keil, Peter Thiemann*  
Institute for Computer Science  
University of Freiburg  
Freiburg, Germany

June 20, 2013, Seattle, WA, USA.

- JavaScript is the most important language for web sites
  - 92 % of all websites use JavaScript
- Web-developers rely on third-party libraries
  - e.g. for calendars, maps, social networks

```
1 <script type="text/javascript">
2     src="http://example.org/api/js/?ARGS">
3 </script>
```

# JavaScript (cont.)

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

- Dynamic programming language
  - e.g. eval, mashups
- JavaScript has no security awareness
  - No namespace or encapsulation management
  - Global scope for variables/functions
  - All scripts have the same authority
- Security aspects of JavaScript received much attention
  - Static or dynamic analysis techniques
  - Guarantees by reducing the functionality

- 1 Libraries may get access to sensitive data
- 2 User code may be prone to injection attacks
- *Naive approach:* detect information flow
  - Pure information flow is too unflexible for investigating injection attacks
  - Ignores sanitized values
- *Our approach:* dependency analysis
  - Addresses both scenarios
  - Sanitized values are acceptable
  - Static Analysis
  - Implemented as extension of a type analyzer

# Examples

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

## Information flow

```
1 var t = Cookie.get('access_token');
2 // processing
3 // ...
4 Ajax.request('example.org', t);
```

# Examples

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

## Information flow

```
1 var t = Cookie.get('access_token');
2 // processing
3 // ...
4 Ajax.request('example.org', t);
```

## Sanitization

```
1 var input = document.getElementById('id');
2 function sanitizer(value) {
3     // clean up value
4 }
5 // processing
6 // ...
7 Ajax.request('example.org', sanitizer(input));
```

## ■ Dependency Analysis

- Information flow pioneered by Denning
- Determines potential data flow between program points
- Related to simple security types

## ■ Flow-sensitive analysis

- Abstracts data tainting
- Stated as type-system

- Built-in **trace** $^{\ell}(e[], id)$  and **untrace**( $e, id$ ) function
  - $\ell$  – unique taint
  - $id$  – tag name
  - Behaves like an identity function
- Implicit classes: UNSAFE, SAFE
- Policy-file
  - For predefined values (e.g. DOM, JavaScript API)

## trace.policy

```
1 # Object Trace
2 trace: HTMLDocument.cookie; Ajax.request;
3 Array.prototype; Math.abs;
```

# Application Scenario

## Sensitive Data

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

```
1 var userHandler = function(uid) {  
2     var name = '';  
3     var onSuccess = function(response) {name = response};  
4     if (alreadyLoaded) {  
5         Cookie.request(uid, onSuccess);  
6     } else {  
7         Ajax.request('example.org', uid, onSuccess);  
8     }  
9     return name;  
10 };  
11 var name = userHandler(trace("uid"));
```

- Security properties on a fine level of granularity
  - Distinguish different sources

# Application Scenario

Sensitive Data

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

```
1 var userHandler = function(uid) {  
2     var name = '';  
3     var onSuccess = function(response) {name = response};  
4     if (alreadyLoaded) { // alreadyLoaded=true  
5         Cookie.request(uid, onSuccess);  
6     } else {  
7         Ajax.request('example.org', uid, onSuccess);  
8     }  
9     return name;  
10 };  
11 var name = userHandler(trace("uid"));
```

- Security properties on a fine level of granularity
  - Distinguish different sources

```
1 var userHandler = function(uid) {  
2     var name = '';  
3     var onSuccess = function(response) {name = response};  
4     if (alreadyLoaded) { // alreadyLoaded=(true|false)  
5         Cookie.request(uid, onSuccess);  
6     } else {  
7         Ajax.request('example.org', uid, onSuccess);  
8     }  
9     return name;  
10 };  
11 var name = userHandler(trace("uid"));
```

- Security properties on a fine level of granularity
  - Distinguish different sources

# Application Scenario

## Foreign Code

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

```
1 loadForeignCode = trace(function() {  
2     Array.prototype.foreach = function(callback) {  
3         // do something  
4     };  
5 });  
6 loadForeignCode();  
7 // do something  
8 array.foreach(function(k, v) {  
9     result = k + v;  
10});
```

- Protect code from being compromised
  - Encapsulation of foreign code

```
1 $ = function( id ) {
2   return trace( document.getElementById( id ).value , "#DOM" );
3 }
4 function sanitizer( value ) {
5   // escape value
6   return untrace( value , "#DOM" );
7 }
8 // do something
9 var input = $("text");
10 var sanitizedInput = sanitizer( input );
11 consumer( sanitizedInput );
```

- Avoid injection attacks
  - e.g. only escaped values used
- Change taint classes

# Application Scenario

## Sanitization (cont)

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

```
var sanitizedInput =  
  i_know_what_i_do ? sanitizer(input) : input;
```


- Mixture of sanitized and unsanitized taints
- Flagged as an error

# Dependency Tracking Semantics

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG




# Dependency Tracking Semantics

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG




# Dependency Tracking Semantics

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG




# Dependency Tracking Semantics

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG




# Dependency Tracking Semantics

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG




# Dependency Tracking Semantics

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG




# Dependency Tracking Semantics

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG



# Technical Contribution

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

- Formalization based on a typed JavaScript Core calculus
- Dependency Tracking Semantics
  - Marker propagation for upcoming values
  - Not meant to perform a dynamic analysis
- Static analysis based on the type system for dependency tracking
  - Termination-insensitive noninterference based on the types
  - Correct abstraction of the tracking semantics
  - Termination of the abstract analysis

# Implementation

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

- Implementation extends TAJS, a Type Analyzer for JavaScript developed by Anders Møller and others
- Abstract values and states are extended with abstract taints
- The control flow graph is extended by special nodes for implicit flows
- **trace<sup>ℓ</sup>** and **untrace** implemented as built-in functions
- Policy file for pre-labeling of built-in objects

# Conclusion

University of Freiburg



UNI  
FREIBURG

- Designed and implemented a type-based dependency analysis for JavaScript
  - Analysis of information flow
  - Encapsulation of foreign code
  - Declassification of values (by changing taint-classes)
- Dependency analysis is not a security analysis
  - Investigate noninterference
  - Ensure confidentiality
  - Verify correct sanitizer placement

## Questions?

Thank you for your attention.